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inevitable exclusions that come with such approaches, 
perhaps we should focus on the exclusions within the 
tradition so that we can continue to make the tradition 
more and more inclusive as we strive to achieve for the 
Latin American philosophical tradition the recognition that 
it deserves.
Doing Away with Juan Crow
José Jorge Mendoza
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS LOWELL
In May of 2008, Roberto Lovato wrote an article for The 
Nation magazine entitled “Juan Crow in Georgia.” Lovato’s 
article begins in a manner that is now familiar to those of 
us who pay close attention to the plight of DREAMers:1 it 
tells us about a sympathetic young person, living in the 
United States under less than ideal circumstances, who 
nonetheless has a big American dream. In this particular 
case, the young person in question is fifteen-year-old Marie 
Justeen Mancha. At the time, Mancha was living with her 
mother in Reidsville, Georgia. The two of them had recently 
migrated to Reidsville and were eking out a meager 
existence by working in onion fields and living out of what 
Lovato describes as a battered old trailer. We are also told 
that, despite the seemingly long odds, Mancha plans to 
one day go to college and become a clinical psychologist. 
In September of 2006 her dreams were put in jeopardy. 
As Mancha was getting ready to go to school, armed 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents raided 
her trailer. These agents had neither warrants, probable 
cause, nor permission to enter Mancha’s residence, but 
they entered anyway and interrogated Mancha over her 
and her mother’s immigration status. At the end of this 
interrogation, the agents simply left. Mancha and her 
mother were not deported. Tragedy was averted because, 
as Lovato informs us, Mancha and her mother were: “the 
wrong kind of ‘Mexicans’; they were US citizens.”2
According to Lovato, Mancha’s experience is not an isolated 
incident, but part of a larger and more troubling trend. As 
he writes:
Mancha and the younger children of the mostly 
immigrant Latinos in Georgia are learning and 
internalizing that they are different from white—
and black—children not just because they have the 
wrong skin color but also because many of their 
parents lack the right papers. They are growing up 
in a racial and political climate in which Latinos’ 
subordinate status in Georgia and in the Deep 
South bears more than a passing resemblance 
to that of African-Americans who were living 
under Jim Crow. Call it Juan Crow: the matrix of 
laws, social customs, economic institutions and 
symbolic systems enabling the physical and 
psychic isolation needed to control and exploit 
undocumented immigrants.3
For a philosopher who is placing freedom at the center of 
his inquiry, this lack of freedom granted to philosophers in 
Latin America seems particularly out of place. Silva seems 
resigned to accepting exclusions, writing, “My goal is not 
to exclude, but undoubtedly, this will be a consequence of 
my project. Instead, my goal is to preserve the tradition of 
thought in LAP that stands out in comparison to Anglophone 
understandings of philosophy.” I think that Silva’s desire to 
preserve the tradition of LAP is of the highest value, and I 
think that he, in fact, has the elements not only to preserve 
but to revive and lead the tradition in new, tradition-
affirming directions. But I don’t think we need to accept 
exclusions born of scorning Latin American thinkers who 
are not concerned with colonization in order to carry out 
the valuable project that Silva has delineated in his paper.
Part of my discomfort with such exclusions is that in 
such moves of exclusion and of scripting who and what 
counts as a Latin American philosopher we ghettoize 
the very tradition we are attempting to preserve, revive, 
and develop. Latin American philosophy and Spanish-
speaking philosophers remain ghettoized. We have special 
committees to oversee the treatment of Hispanics in 
philosophy, in part because inclusiveness of this group 
cannot be taken for granted. We have to market sessions 
at the American Philosophical Association meetings so 
that they will appeal to mainstream philosophers: logic 
in Brazil is a crowd pleaser, while the topic of indigenous 
thought in America draws only a few eccentrics. The theme 
of German philosophy in the Americas is seen as more 
valuable than addressing the problem of modernity in Latin 
American, for the stentorian philosophical voice of the 
German tradition inevitably overpowers the muffled voice 
of the Latin American tradition. Paying serious attention to 
something like the problem of modernity in Latin America 
would surely be a sign of progress, of an overcoming of 
the “colonial condition” in which we have placed Latin 
American philosophy, for it would present Latin American 
thought in an autonomous light. But we cannot secure 
such autonomous light by limiting the freedom of Latin 
American thinkers, preventing them from taking their 
thought where their questions lead them. Whether we 
think the resulting work is good or bad is one matter, and 
we might even agree that the best work done within the 
tradition of Latin American philosophy is the work that deals 
explicitly with the colonial condition. But to deny that a 
given contribution by a Latin American thinker simply does 
not belong to the tradition because of its content seems 
not only wrong but damaging to the very future of the 
tradition. Colonial struggle is a central problem of the Latin 
American philosophical tradition, but why must we create a 
hierarchy according to which only those contributions that 
address this matter are really Latin American philosophical 
contributions—why not acknowledge that the tendency 
of thought within the Latin American tradition that deals 
with colonial struggle is a central one, a tendency that has 
shaped many of the valuable contributions of that tradition, 
while also acknowledging that there are other tendencies? 
Even if we cannot offer final words on what Latin American 
philosophy is, certainly we can all agree that there is a 
vast territory of themes and figures, of questions and of 
proposed answers to those questions. Rather than looking 
for exhaustive definitions and becoming entangled in the 
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citizen of the European Union and of the city of Berlin, and 
therefore be lawfully present in Germany and eligible to 
vote in certain elections, even though s/he is not a German 
citizen. Federalism therefore offers an immigration reform 
alternative that is both consistent with democratic norms—
especially with regard to democratic representation at the 
transnational and local levels—and more open borders. 
Within the immigration debate, Thomas Pogge, Veit Bader, 
Seyla Benhabib, and to some extent William Flores and 
Renato Rosaldo, have championed some version of this 
view.10
For supporters of immigrant rights, this approach seems 
to hold a lot of promise. After all, while attempts at 
comprehensive immigration reform have stalled at the 
national level, over the last decade there has been a 
groundswell of local and state ordinances that seek to 
protect immigrants and extend benefits to all residents 
(including undocumented immigrants). For example, cities 
such as San Francisco, Denver, and New York now prohibit 
city employees (including police offers) from inquiring into 
people’s immigration status and, in general, are refusing to 
let their local resources be used to help enforce national 
immigration laws. There have also been actions taken at 
the state level, where states such as California, Washington, 
and Nebraska have granted driver’s licenses, in-state 
tuition, and health care to all of their residents regardless 
of immigration status. And even states that support stricter 
immigration enforcement, such as Texas and Utah, have 
proposed their own guest worker programs tailored to 
their own particular needs, rather than the current one-
size-fits-all national model. While guest worker programs 
are not always great, if these state-level programs were to 
be implemented, many undocumented workers currently 
working in those states would be given legal status.
Conservatives in the United States have complained that 
these actions are unconstitutional and that local and state 
governments have over reached and should be punished 
by the national government. However, a generous reading 
of the U.S. Constitution would suggest that conservatives 
are wrong and that these local and state governments 
are on firm constitutional ground. For example, the U.S. 
Constitution only twice mentions matters directly relating 
to immigration, and neither time does it say much about 
where the power to establish immigration policy should 
reside.11 Along with this, there is the Tenth Amendment (i.e., 
the federalist amendment), which states that “the powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.” When read in this way, it 
seems that there is nothing explicitly unconstitutional 
about the aforementioned actions taken by local and state 
governments.
PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE: THE TYRANNY OF 
CENTRALIZED POWER
Despite the reading I have just provided, there is a long 
history backed by judicial precedent that has allowed the 
U.S. national12 government to consistently usurp the power 
to control immigration and exercise it in questionable ways. 
For example, in 1798 President John Adams signed into law 
In the passage above, Lovato is both describing the wrong 
of Juan Crow and alluding to its connection to Jim Crow. 
While there are some very important differences between 
the two, Lovato seems to be suggesting that Juan Crow is 
similar to Jim Crow in that they are both instances of local 
and state laws being used in a systematic way to violate the 
civil rights and equal protection of minority citizens. In this 
essay, I would like to explore the implication Juan Crow has 
for an ethics of immigration. I want to argue that Juan Crow 
poses a challenge not only to federalist approaches to 
immigration reform, but to any immigration reform that has 
stricter enforcement as a key component. Instead, I want to 
suggest that a just immigration reform must adhere to two 
standards, equality of burdens and universal protections, 
and that only by doing so can the potential for Juan Crow 
be accurately avoided.
THE FEDERALIST ALTERNATIVE
Philosophers working on the ethics of immigration face an 
interesting challenge. It is assumed that political legitimacy 
requires a community to be both democratically self-
determined and respectful of human rights. Yet the issue of 
immigration (maybe more so than any other issue) exposes 
a deep tension between these two commitments.4 For 
example, a commitment to democratic self-determination 
would seem to suggest that a political community has a 
presumptive right to control its borders and determine its 
own criteria for citizenship.5 However, a commitment to 
individual freedom or universal equality (i.e., the pillars of 
human rights) seems to speak in favor of open borders; 
either because respecting an individual’s right to freedom 
of movement is weighty enough to override most of the 
reasons a political community would have to deny him 
or her admission6 or because restrictive borders help to 
perpetuate or create unjust global inequalities.7 
This is an exaggerated and simplistic way of situating the 
current philosophical debate over immigration, so it’s worth 
mentioning that there are other nuanced positions that do 
not fit nicely into this neat division. For example, Arash 
Abizadeh has argued that a commitment to democratic 
norms would entail political communities not have the 
unilateral right to control their borders,8 while Peter Higgins 
and Lea Ypi have argued that open borders would not 
necessarily promote universal equality and in fact could do 
the opposite.9 Still, the philosophical question surrounding 
immigration has primarily remained focused on how to best 
reconcile democratic self-determination with human rights.
Out of all the possible contenders that have emerged 
in this debate, the one that seems to hold the most 
promise is the federalist approach. Federalism advocates 
for a dispersed notion of sovereignty, where political 
authority over a territory is allowed to operate at various 
levels. These different levels usually have one top level, 
for example, a central government or a supranational 
institution, and smaller subdivisions operating underneath, 
such as provincial, state, or local governments. On this 
model, the power to make and enforce laws operates 
on all these different levels with each enjoying a certain 
degree of autonomy. On this model, people do not need 
to be members at every level in order to obtain certain 
citizenship rights. For example, a person could be a 
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to that extent is an incident of every independent 
nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could 
not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject 
to the control of another power.15
This case, along with the other Chinese exclusion cases, has 
come to form the legal backbone of what is known as the 
Plenary Power Doctrine. This doctrine gives the U.S. national 
government a monopoly over the regulation of immigration, 
meaning its exercise of power in this area is not subject 
to judicial review. The lack of judicial review means that, 
with regard to cases involving the admission, exclusion, 
and deportation of noncitizens, constitutional protections 
(e.g., right to a trial by jury, right to court appointed legal 
representation, and freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures) are not applicable.16
These examples do not exhaust the list of abuses, but they 
are sufficient to underscore the following worry: there is a 
very real danger in a centralized approach to immigration 
policy because when given discretionary control over the 
admission, exclusion, and deportation of noncitizens, 
national governments have shown themselves incapable 
of not using this power in morally or politically problematic 
ways. In light of this worry, a federalist approach to 
immigration reform seems much more appealing. After all, 
federalism offers a way to break up or at least check the 
concentration of power without at the same time having to 
give up the notion of sovereignty (i.e., self-determination). 
With that said, however, there is an underside to federalism, 
and this underside is nowhere better exemplified than in 
the case of Jim Crow.
THE UNDERSIDE OF FEDERALISM AND THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE
As most people are aware, the U.S. Civil War put an end 
to chattel slavery and annulled the infamous Dred Scott 
decision that had denied U.S. citizenship to people of 
African descent. These achievements were constitutionally 
enshrined with the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments. Immediately after the 
passage of these amendments, however, local and state 
governments of the former Confederacy began to pass 
their own laws in an effort to circumvent the spirit of these 
amendments. These laws appeared neutral on the surface, 
but when implemented, they created a legalized form of 
racial segregation. 
The constitutionality of these laws were tested and 
notoriously upheld in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases and the 
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson case. These cases provided the legal 
precedent for what came to be known as the “separate but 
equal” doctrine. This doctrine basically stated that so long 
as facilities and institutions were equal, racial segregation 
was not in itself a breach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal protection clause. The ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson 
is especially disconcerting for proponents of federalism 
because in making its case the state of Louisiana appealed 
specifically to the Tenth Amendment (i.e., the federalist 
amendment) and won the case on those grounds. 
a set of bills that have come to be known as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. These bills were signed in the aftermath of 
the French Revolution, during a time that is now commonly 
referred to as the Quasi-War with France. The stated aim 
of these bills was to root out the “Jacobin threat” posed 
by French immigrants. Among other things, these bills 
increased residency requirements for naturalization from 
five to fourteen years, made speech critical of the U.S. 
government into a punishable offense, and allowed the 
president to imprison or deport any non-citizen who was 
considered “dangerous” or who was a citizen of a hostile 
nation. 
In the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison presented a federalist response 
to these actions taken by the national government. 
Jefferson, for example, argued that these actions were 
unconstitutional because
if the acts before specified should stand, these 
conclusions would flow from them; that the 
General Government may place any act they think 
proper on the list of crimes & punish it themselves, 
whether enumerated or not enumerated by the 
Constitution as cognizable by them: that they may 
transfer its cognizance to the President or any 
other person, who may himself be the accuser, 
counsel, judge, and jury, whose suspicions may be 
the evidence, his order the sentence, his officer 
the executioner, and his breast the sole record of 
the transaction.13
Jefferson’s worry was that the national government, and 
specifically the executive branch, was using the threat of a 
foreign menace to consolidate powers that the Constitution 
had not intended for it to have. This consolidation of 
power was troubling for Jefferson because, even if these 
powers were intended only to be used on noncitizens, 
they eventually could be turned on citizens. As Jefferson 
warns further down in this resolution: “the friendless alien 
has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first 
experiment: but the citizen will soon follow, or rather has 
already followed; for, already has a Sedition Act marked 
him as its prey.”14
Another example of this questionable usurpation of power 
comes in the form of the explicit racist immigration laws and 
policies that began with the passage of 1875 Page Act. This 
act was the first of many acts to restrict the entry of nonwhite 
immigrants into the United States. During this period of 
explicitly racist national immigration policy, the Supreme 
Court consistently ruled in favor of the U.S. government 
by appealing to a more unitary (as opposed to federalist) 
understanding of U.S. sovereignty. For example, writing for 
the majority in the 1889 Chae Chan Ping v. United States 
case, Justice Stephen J. Field argued that Mr. Ping had no 
right to be readmitted into the United States, even though 
he had a government issued return voucher, because
the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its 
territory is a proposition which we do not think open 
to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory 
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immigrants are swarming into their territory and the 
national government has failed to do anything about it. 
This has encouraged them in turn to pass a variety of anti-
immigrant laws at the local and state level. The overall 
strategy these local and state governments have followed 
has been centered on enforcement, hence the mantras of 
“enforcement first” and “attrition through enforcement.” 
These laws are therefore not designed to try to reform or 
repair the current immigration system. Instead, they are 
aimed at obtaining better and more efficient enforcement 
of the current one. They also recognize the difficulty of 
rounding up and deporting 10-12 million undocumented 
immigrants, so along with bringing stricter enforcement 
these laws are also designed to try to make the day-to-day 
lives of undocumented immigrants so miserable that they 
begin to self-deport. 
As we saw in the opening case of Marie Justeen Mancha, 
not all Latino/as who migrate to parts of the former 
Confederacy are foreigners. In fact, most Latino/as in the 
United States are a lot like Mancha, U.S.-born citizens who 
are nonetheless being forced to bear the brunt of anti-
immigrant laws and policies. In this regard we find the 
similarity to Jim Crow. The anti-immigrant laws that have 
come out of “enforcement first” and “attrition through 
enforcement” approaches to immigration reform are being 
passed at the local and state level by an overwhelming 
democratic majority, and they also appear neutral on the 
surface. When these laws are put into effect, however, they 
have a disparate impact on a particular minority segment of 
the citizenry (i.e., Latino/as). If the comparison to Jim Crow 
is warranted, then the recent actions taken by the Obama 
administration seem consistent with the earlier actions 
taken by presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. 
In response to Juan Crow, the Obama administration 
has sued the state of Arizona for its “attrition through 
enforcement” inspired Senate Bill. In 2012 this lawsuit 
went before the Supreme Court, where Arizona defended 
its actions in the same way Louisiana had in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, by appealing to the Tenth Amendment. This time, 
however, the court found that Arizona’s anti-immigration 
bill was largely unconstitutional. It was unconstitutional 
not because of the harm it would cause foreigners or 
even Latino/a citizens, but because its actions violated 
the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause is found in 
Article XI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and it states 
that when national law conflicts with state law, national 
law wins out. This is commonly referred to as preemption, 
and it gives the national government exclusive power to 
legislate over such areas as war and commerce.
Following this victory in the courts and at the behest of 
DREAMer activists, President Obama went on to issue an 
executive order granting deferred action (i.e., protection 
from deportation) to undocumented immigrants who 
entered the country before the age of sixteen (i.e., DACA). 
This past November, Obama extended this deferred 
action to include undocumented immigrants who are the 
parents of U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents (i.e., 
DAPA). This latter action, however, has been challenged 
by 26 states and its constitutionality is still currently being 
debated in the courts. Again, most of the states that have 
Jim Crow segregation was legally in effect throughout 
the former Confederacy from the end of Reconstruction 
(1877-ish) until the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision. The Brown decision, however, did not by itself 
settle the matters. In 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval 
Faubus defied the court’s decision by calling out the state’s 
National Guard in an effort to prevent black students from 
entering Little Rock Central High School and made an 
appeal to “state’s rights” in justifying his actions. President 
Eisenhower responded to Faubus’s actions by deploying 
the U.S. army and nationalizing Arkansas’s National Guard. 
In 1963, Alabama Governor George Wallace—living up 
to his inaugural address promise of “segregation now, 
segregation tomorrow, segregation forever”—had his 
infamous “Stand in the Schoolhouse Door” debacle where 
he physically stood at the entrance to the University of 
Alabama in order to prevent black students from enrolling. 
Again, it took executive action, this time on the part of 
President Kennedy, to remove him.
It seems that one lesson that can be gleamed from the 
struggle against Jim Crow is that when local or state 
governments deny members of disadvantaged social 
groups their civil rights and equal protection, executive 
action at the national level can be an effective way of 
remedying the situation. This presents a further problem for 
proponents of federalism. The struggle against Jim Crow 
was successful not because of an increase in democratic 
procedures, since the majority of residents in Alabama 
and Arkansas would have likely favored segregation, or a 
decentralizing of power, as it took action at the national 
level to bring this practice to an end. It is in this vein that 
champions of immigrant rights, such as Representative Luis 
Gutierrez, have for years pleaded with President Obama to 
use his executive powers to act on immigration. 
The sense of urgency that proponents of immigrant rights, 
such as Gutierrez, feel stems from the fact that it is not 
only immigrants who are being negatively affected by 
Congress’s inability to pass comprehensive immigration 
reform; U.S. citizens are also being negatively impacted by 
this gridlock. In recent years, citizens like Marie Justeen 
Mancha have been migrating in greater numbers to parts 
of the United States where historically Latino/as have not 
resided in large numbers. Specifically, Latino/as have 
started to make homes for themselves in parts of the 
former Confederacy. The immediate assumption by many 
of the residents in these parts is that these new migrants do 
not belong. Some of the worries these residents have are 
driven by xenophobic attitudes and beliefs, but some truly 
believe that these new migrants are all undocumented and 
their presence is evidence that the national government 
is failing to do its job of enforcing immigration law. This 
despite the fact that the actual number of undocumented 
immigrants has remained steady for close to a decade, 
somewhere between 10-12 million, and in recent years has 
actually seen a decline. Also, since President Obama took 
office in 2009, the U.S. government has been deporting 
close to 400,000 undocumented immigrants a year, which 
is more than under any other previous administration. 
Regardless of these facts, the public perception in 
states of the former Confederacy is that undocumented 
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access to certain benefits, while at the same time precluding 
the possibility of draconian immigration enforcement.
IMMIGRATION REFORM WITHOUT JUAN CROW
In my view, an ideal approach to immigration reform only 
appears to want it both ways. It gains this appearance from 
how the debate over immigration has played out in the 
United States, as a contest between the Supremacy Clause 
(i.e., the national government’s check on federalism gone 
amuck) and the Tenth Amendment (i.e., state’s rights). 
When the immigration debate is framed in this way, the 
point that Marie Justeen Mancha’s story is supposed to 
drive home gets overlooked. The fight against Juan Crow 
is less about locating the power to control immigration and 
more about circumventing that power, at every level, so 
that certain segments of the citizenry do not get ostracized 
when and if it gets exercised. This suggests that, regardless 
of whether a country chooses to adopt a more centralized 
or federalist approach to immigration reform, the important 
question to address is how should enforcement be limited?
The answer I propose is that immigration enforcement 
should have to adhere to something like the following two 
standards: equality of burdens and universal protections. An 
equality of burdens standard would require that whatever 
burdens result from the enforcement of immigration policy, 
those burdens should be allocated as equally as possible 
among the citizenry. For example, if agents are allowed to 
conduct raids on private homes or places of work, then 
every citizen’s home or place of work should potentially 
be as likely to be raided as any other citizen’s home or 
place of work. I understand this might make immigration 
enforcement less efficient, but there are at least two good 
reasons why the implementation of this standard outweighs 
this concern. 
First, it would make citizens more reflective about the kind of 
enforcement they are willing to let their government deploy. 
Since most citizens currently do not feel like they have much 
to worry about with internal immigration enforcement, the 
majority has shown itself to be increasingly willing to have 
stricter immigration enforcement, even when this increase 
negatively impacts the lives of minority citizens. By having a 
majority, and not just a minority, of citizens share in the cost 
of stricter enforcement, the excesses of this enforcement 
will not only be more fairly distributed, they will also impact 
decisions about the quality and quantity of enforcement.
Second, while this standard might not change deeply 
entrenched social attitudes on race, ethnicity, or culture, 
it will prevent those attitudes from unduly influencing 
enforcement and in the process self-affirm negative 
stereotypes about minority groups. While some might 
argue that this standard would prohibit all forms of selective 
enforcement, it would actually only prohibit selective 
enforcement when it disproportionately harms citizens for 
morally arbitrary reasons (e.g., race, ethnicity, or culture). In 
other words, while it might be okay for enforcement agents 
to focus more of their attention on people who self-identify 
as members of an outlaw motorcycle gang (e.g., wear a 
particular kind of leather jacket), as this is not a morally 
arbitrary reason, it would not be okay for enforcement 
agents to focus more of their attention on people who 
challenged the president’s use of deferred action are states 
of the former Confederacy.
 For those who support immigrant rights, the recent actions 
taken by President Obama seem like cause for celebration. 
I want to suggest, however, that while these actions should 
be supported, they are at best incomplete and at worst 
Pyrrhic victories. President Obama has been able to provide 
undocumented immigrants with some relief through the 
use of executive action, but the way out of Juan Crow is not 
through executive action. Executive actions have a history 
of cutting both ways and so there are good reasons for 
being skeptical of them.
For example, three months after Japan bombed Pearl 
Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. 
This executive order forcefully removed between 110,000 
and 120,000 mostly U.S. citizens of Japanese descent from 
their homes and placed them in internment camps far away 
from the Pacific Ocean. The reason behind this removal was 
the belief that lurking within this particular segment of the 
citizenry were potential spies who would relay signals to 
the Japanese navy if allowed to remain close to the Pacific 
Ocean. The case of Japanese interment is now taken to be 
one of the more disgraceful moments in U.S. history, but it 
is still important as a poignant reminder of how executive 
action can cut both ways. The actions of the executive 
branch can at times be used to protect the most vulnerable 
in our society, such as the actions by Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
or Obama might exemplify, but they can also be fueled by 
or be used to pursue racist or xenophobic ends. 
A further complication with looking to the national 
government to provide relief from Juan Crow is that most 
of the enforcement measures that give rise to Juan Crow 
are already present at the national level. For example, 
the national immigration and welfare reform laws that 
were passed in 1996 allow the national government to 
commandeer local police for immigration enforcement 
duties, require employers to check the immigration status 
of their employees, and make immigrants ineligible for 
various sorts of benefits such as welfare and Medicare.17 
Again, while the letter of the law does not single out any 
particular social group, its application has disproportionately 
impacted citizens of non-European descent and especially 
U.S.-born children whose parents lack proper immigration 
status.
Federalist and centralized approaches to immigration 
reform therefore seem to leave us in a kind of quagmire: 
giving the national government too much discretion over 
immigration has historically proven problematic (e.g., 
Alien and Sedition Acts and Chinese Exclusion Acts), but 
supporting the kind of federalism that would allow local 
and state governments to check the national government’s 
power and provide immigrants with some relief (e.g., offer 
them sanctuary, driver’s licenses, and in-state tuition) 
would also allow these governments to pass their own anti-
immigrant ordinances (e.g., Arizona’s SB 1070). An ideal 
approach to immigration reform (i.e., one that avoids the 
potential for Juan Crow) seems to want it both ways. It wants 
to allow local, state, and national governments to provide 
immigrants with some protections and unencumbered 
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of one’s own position on immigration, it is 
difficult to argue with the fact that what happened to Marie 
Justeen Mancha was unjust and that under a just regime 
those sorts of incidents should never occur. This belief is 
undergirded by an intuition that most of us share: legitimate 
political communities have a responsibility to treat their 
citizens as political equals and to not excessively or without 
warrant intrude on their lives. This intuition is expressed 
in what I have come to call the equality of burdens and 
universal protections standards. These two standards might 
not be enough to bring an end to racism or xenophobia, but 
adhering to them in immigration policy will prove sufficient 
to thwart the conditions that give rise to Juan Crow. 
It’s true that these standards limit the discretion political 
communities have in controlling immigration, and in 
today’s political climate a position like this is largely out 
of favor. With that said, however, I still think we need to 
ask ourselves whether sacrificing the civil rights and equal 
protection of a minority citizen is worth enforcing an 
immigration system that all sides agree is broken. Instead 
of doubling down and continuing to enforce such a system, 
why not be open to the possibility of radically revising it? 
Of adopting an immigration system that can be enforced 
in a just and fair manner because its policy for admissions 
reflects global realities as opposed to xenophobic fears? 
It’s true that such a revised system would likely entail much 
more open borders than most Americans are currently 
comfortable with, but then again no one ever said doing 
the right thing would be easy or popular.
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self-identify with a particular kind of religion (e.g., Islam) 
or different part of the world (e.g., Latin America) because 
those are morally arbitrary reasons.
Along with an equality of burdens standard, just 
immigration reform will also require something like a 
universal protections standard. This standard would 
complement the equality of burdens standard by requiring 
mechanisms for oversight and restrictions on excessive 
government coercion. It is difficult to say what specific 
types of oversight or restrictions this standard would entail, 
as different communities will have their own unique set of 
circumstances and challenges, but there does seem to be 
at least one universal restriction that this standard would 
always entail. There must at least be a “presumption of 
innocence” restriction. In the immigration context, this 
would mean that all persons present should be treated as 
though they are lawfully present until their status has been 
confirmed to be irregular and even then should be treated 
with the dignity that is owed to all human beings. 
In more concrete terms, if U.S. immigration enforcement 
policy were to adhere to something like a universal 
protections standard, it would need to give all persons 
present, regardless of their immigration status, such basic 
protections as the right to due process, equal protection 
under the law, freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, a right to an attorney, and protection from 
indefinite detention, which is currently not the case in 
removal proceedings.18 Protections like these are essential 
because without them immigration controls could easily 
infringe on both the rights of citizen and on human rights 
more generally.
When taken together, these two standards provide a 
canopy of protections that serve as a basis for immigrant 
rights. For example, one of the more odious aspects of 
current immigration law, which makes Juan Crow possible, 
is the commandeering of police officers for immigration 
enforcement purposes. This practice would be prohibited 
by these two standards because of its potential for abuse 
(e.g., police could use immigration enforcement as an 
excuse for harassing already marginalized communities), 
the risk that makes marginalized citizens even more 
vulnerable (e.g., victims of crimes, such as domestic 
violence, who also happen to live in mixed-status 
households could be hesitant to call police), and it would 
hinder the larger goal of fighting and preventing crime 
(e.g., undocumented immigrants are less likely to come 
forward to report or serve as witnesses for crimes if doing 
so might expose them to deportation, yet the safety of 
communities is dependent on the lawful cooperation of 
all persons present, regardless of immigration status). A 
similar argument can also be extended to include such 
areas as employment, home rentals, enrolling children in 
school, and many other everyday activities. An immigration 
policy that adheres to these two standards would prohibit 
enforcement schemes from intruding into these areas and 
by doing so would largely curtail the potential for Juan 
Crow.19
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will show how the slave trade, mestizaje, 
and U.S. laws are constitutive elements in the construction 
of Mexican-American identity. During the slave trade, the 
Spanish colonialist established white identity as a source 
of supremacy, protection, and civilization.1 Today, even 
as Mexican-Americans and U.S. law classifies Mexican-
Americans as white, they do not share the same protection 
and privilege associated with whiteness.2 Utilizing insights 
from legal history, I provide a contemporary framework 
that focuses, engages, and critically assesses the Mexican-
American struggle with his circumstance. Making use of 
the work of several Mexican-American scholars who expose 
contradictions that exist between the idea of the Mexican-
American and his actual circumstances, I show how Mexican-
American philosophy must be an intimate relationship 
between ideas and historical circumstances. Furthermore, I 
show how dominant-group-controlled institutions exercise 
control over Mexican-American culture.
COLONIAL CREATION OF THE MEXICAN-
AMERICAN
Since the late fifteenth century, Spanish colonialists 
developed a complex set of rules creating a race-based 
caste system with a distinct anti-black bias.3 Concerned with 
drawing distinctions between products of miscegenation, 
the Spanish divided offspring of mixed couples into 
three general groups: mestizo (Spanish-Indian), mulatto 
(Spanish-Black), and Zambo or Zambaigo (Black-Indian).4 
Mixing of these three groups created the Black mestizo and 
other subdivisions within these categories. The offspring of 
miscegenation union, called las castas, due to their African 
ancestry, occupied the lowest socio-economic status.5 As 
Taunya Lovel Banks notes in her essay, “Mestizaje and the 
Mexican Mestizo Self: No Hay Sangre Negra,” “to prevent 
Afro-mestizo slaves passing as Indians, masters often used 
hot irons to brand “the insignia of servitude” on slaves’ 
faces, or other places readily apparent to the observer.”6 The 
Spaniards created a class and racial system where “Spanish 
and white blood is redeemable . . . [and] inextricably linked 
to the idea of civilization . . . and Black blood bear[s] the 
stigma of slavery, [and] atavism and degeneracy.”7 The 
Spanish colonialists created a legal classification system 
based on hue or phenotype that birthed whiteness as 
the vanguard of redemption, reason, and humanity: 
“Afro-mestizos consistently tried to conceal their African 
ancestry because under rule, Indians had a higher socio-
economic status than castas . . . even free Afro-mestizos 
had an interest in hiding their African ancestry since by law 
mulattoes, but not mestizos, were subject to paying tribute 
in the form of head taxes.”8 
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